By Dr. Abejide Olusegun

Recently, a self-proclaimed Nigerian political expert appeared on Channels Television and made a statement laden with delusion. He suggested, “The day El-Rufai decides and galvanizes opinion leaders and the power base in the North toward a PDP candidate, like Peter Obi, it would mark the end of the Tinubu administration.” Such a claim reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of Nigerian political dynamics and exposes the naive wishful thinking prevalent among much of the Northern elite.

First, let’s clarify how presidential elections are won in Nigeria. It’s not about social media noise, televised bravado, or imagined statistics. Winning the presidency requires a strategic consolidation of key levers of power. You need the support of seven critical governors: Lagos, Bayelsa, Delta, Rivers, Kano, Kaduna, and control over the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) governor, which makes the number of governors seven. These governors represent not only political dominance but also the financial resources needed to sustain a winning campaign. Even political newcomers should grasp the significance of these political and financial strongholds.

Currently, the control over these seven essential states is clear. While Kano and Kaduna may not have the highest voter counts, they are vital for the political logistics and financial framework that drive national elections.

In addition to governors, a serious contender must control 44 of the nation’s senatorial districts. Awarding at least ten significant contracts in the first year of office is essential, ensuring that fifteen percent of those contractors are positioned to influence election outcomes. These contractors, indebted to the administration, effectively become campaign engines when elections arrive.

Another crucial yet often overlooked lever is the control of federal institutions: the Chief Justice, the Inspector General of Police, the Customs Controller General, the NNPC GMD, and the CBN Governor. Without command over these vital structures, the dream of winning a Nigerian presidential election remains just that—a dream.

Furthermore, the suspension of corruption cases against affluent former governors, who have ravaged their state finances, serves as a pragmatic political strategy. These individuals possess substantial financial resources and extensive networks of influence. By managing their fates through unresolved corruption cases, the sitting president secures their allegiance. El-Rufai himself exemplifies this scenario—his financial improprieties are carefully contained. He and others in similar positions understand that their freedom hinges on their cooperation.

This issue is not limited to Nigeria. Across Africa, the incumbency advantage remains strong. From Paul Biya in Cameroon to Yoweri Museveni in Uganda, the pattern is consistent: incumbent presidents seldom lose unless they have a significant falling out with their power bases.

The recent rhetoric from El-Rufai, the governor of Bauchi, and others is simply political theatrics. Their purported “grand plan” for 2027 lacks substance. Without understanding the true dynamics of Nigerian political power, their opposition is as futile as shouting at a hurricane.

Moreover, Nigerians must recognize that the “Northern numbers” that once served as a potent political weapon are no longer in play. The Middle Belt has shifted away from its traditional alignment with the core north, and the Hausa people have distanced themselves from Fulani dominance. Today, when one speaks of “Arewa,” it mainly refers to the Fulani minority. The Hausa, the Middle Belt communities, and other northern minorities have seen through the Fulani agenda of control, land appropriation, and destruction.

The nefarious activities associated with Fulani herdsmen militias, banditry, and kidnappings have only further isolated them. Nigerians are now more aware than ever; the public is alert. The Fulani stand politically alone. Their last strategy may involve seeking a southern candidate to oppose Tinubu, but this is likely a futile endeavor, as no credible southern candidate with broad appeal capable of unseating Tinubu has emerged.

It is crucial to understand that winning elections in Nigeria requires coalition-building across geopolitical zones. Tinubu, more than many others, grasps this reality. He has solid support from Yoruba states, influential allies in the South-South, a neutral presence in the South-East, and has effectively neutralized opposition from the Middle Belt. These factors ensure that regional troublemakers cannot form a cohesive opposition.

In 2015, when Buhari defeated Goodluck Jonathan, the victory was not solely a northern mandate; it was a coalition that included support from the South-West. In 2019, Buhari retained power because his political apparatus remained intact. Tinubu’s structure is even more sophisticated and extensive.

Historically, even in countries like Ghana, incumbents rarely lose unless there is a significant internal rift. In Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, Obasanjo won re-election in 2003 despite fierce opposition by solidifying the mechanisms of power, just as Tinubu is doing now.

The supposed threat of a Fulani-backed southern candidate is unrealistic. The Nigerian electorate has matured, with tribal loyalties diminishing. People now prioritize visible achievements, national unity, and economic pragmatism.

El-Rufai’s disdain for Tinubu is personal, petty, and politically inconsequential; it lacks significant electoral impact. His influence is waning, confined to Abuja cocktail circuits and Twitter tirades. His animosity arises from Tinubu’s rise as the national figure El-Rufai has always aspired to be but never became.

The Fulani agenda to destabilize Nigeria’s political landscape through intimidation, manufactured crises, and manipulation of northern sentiments is dead on arrival. Nigerians will no longer be bullied.

Tinubu’s economic reforms, infrastructural projects, and efforts to build political bridges across ethnic and religious lines are solidifying his legacy, though not yet seen on the surface by the populace because they are microeconomic strategies for now, which is the first strategy for a serious leader to handle during reform. Very soon, before 2027, those micro strategies will transform into macro ones, just as can be seen in the reduced petrol pump prices presently. By the end of 2026, the whole country will embrace Tinubu, even including the so-called northern electorate. His presidency is more deeply rooted than critics acknowledge.

Therefore, Nigerians should disregard the empty boasts of El-Rufai and others like him. Instead, they should focus on strengthening democratic gains, supporting infrastructure development, stabilizing security, and advancing the economic repositioning that is currently underway.

In 2027, as in 2023, power will not shift due to noise or delusions. It will remain with those who master the strategic architecture of Nigerian politics.

The lesson is clear: In Nigeria and across Africa, the incumbent who plays their cards wisely, manages alliances effectively, and distributes benefits strategically does not lose. Tinubu is playing this game like a grandmaster.

As for El-Rufai and his associates, their political demise is already sealed. They will soon realize that their arrogance, selfish ambitions, and betrayal of national unity will lead to nothing but political isolation.

Tinubu may not be perfect, but he represents Nigeria’s best hope for fragile unity and continued progress. It is time for Nigerians to rally around the future, rather than regress to the same old games that have plagued the nation for decades.

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